# Summer Flounder Quota Allocation Analysis 

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December 13, 2016

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Developing a model of individual angler behavior
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Recreational Analysis

## Study Outline

## Goal of Recreational Component:

Measure the benefits (or costs) to recreational anglers from a change in the summer flounder quota.

Key Steps:

- Develop a model of individual angler behavior
- Develop a measure of the costs or benefits from quota changes
- Aggregate results to population
- Using aggregate results, develop marginal analysis for allocation recommendations
- Recognize limitations of model


## What is the data telling us about Summer Flounder?

(1) Focus on NC to MA
(2) Drop waves 1 (Jan-Feb) and 6 (Nov-Dec)
(3) Summer Flounder is heavily caught and targeted
(1) Even non-targeted trips might catch summer flounder

## The Econometric Model

Our work follows previous work by McConnell and Strand, and Hicks et al.

## Key Insight:

The summary data suggests that even those not directly targeting SF may catch SF and therefore, we need a model that allows trip values to be influenced by a broad range of species.

## The Econometric Model: Choice Structure

## Choice structure:

- We model the choice of mode [shore, private/rental, party/charter], species group [small game, bottom fish, summer flounder] ${ }^{1}$, and fishing site (at the county level).
- $80 \times 3 \times 3$ potential choice alternatives per observed trip in the data.
- We have approximately 30,000 trips (in NC-MA in 2014) $\times$ 720 choice alternatives $=21.6$ million rows of data for modeling!

[^0]
## McConnell/Strand Species Groupings

| Small Game |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Striped Bass | Blucfish | Jack |
| Pompano | Seatrout | Bonefish |
| Bonito | Snook | Red Drum |
| Barracuda | Mackerel |  |
| Bottom Fish |  |  |
| Sandbar Shark | Dogfish Shark | Cat Shark |
| Sand Tiger Shark | Smooth Dog Shark | Carp |
| Catfish | Toadfish | Cod/Codfish |
| Pollack | Hake | Sea Robin |
| Sca Bass | Sawfish | Grunt |
| Kingfish | Mullett | Tautog |
| Butterfish | Nurse Shark | Brown Cat Shark |
| Porgy/Scup | Sheepshead | Pinfish |
| Snapper | Grouper | Perch |
| Black Drum |  |  |
| Flat Fish |  |  |
| Summer Flounder | Winter Flounder | Southem Flounder |
| Sole | Founders |  |
| Big Game |  |  |
| Blue Shark | Tuna | Marlin |
| Thresher Shark | Great Hammerhead | Swordfish |
| Shortfin Mako Shark | Tiger Shark | White Shark |
| Smooth Hammerhead | Scalloped Hammer | Tarpon |
| Billfish | Sailfish | Dolphin |
| Cobia | Wahoo |  |
| Other Fish |  |  |
| Herring | Eel | Skate |
| Puffer | Blacktip Shark | Requiem Shark |
| Dusky Shark | Atlantic Sharpnose | Bull Shark |
| Smalltail Shark |  |  |

## The Econometric Model: Choice Structure Reduction

## Reducing size of Choice Structure

Using the NOAA Fisheries S\&T distance files, we limit the choice structure to those sites within 150 miles of the respondents home.

Note: This necessarily eliminates all persons in the MRIP sample living far away ( $>150$ miles) from their chosen site.

## The Econometric Model: Expected Catch, Release, and Keep

## Correcting for MRIPS Sampling Intensity

Since strata are over (under) sampled in MRIPS, we use the supplied sample weights for calculating any summary statistic (e.g. average per site catch for summer flounder) in this study.

## RUM Choice Model for Recreation Demand



Expected Utility (Enjoyment) of Fishing Experience

## Policy Analysis: CV for Keep versus Release of SF

For our purposes, all x's will remain as observed in the data, except for landings and released historical catch averages for summer flounder. Note that the allocation policy

- Doesn't alter total catch (combined keep and release)
- Does alter the distribution of total catch between keep and release categories.


## Example: a $+\mathbf{1 0 \%}$ Increase in Summer Flounder Allocations to the Recreational Sector

Table 1: Example Policy Impacts on Catch and Keep Rates

| Policy | Total Catch | Landings | Release |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0 | 5 | 3 | 2 |
| 1 | 5 | 3.3 | 1.7 |

## Policy Analysis: Compensating Variation

The standard welfare calculation for angler $i$ at time $t$ (defined as compensating variation (CV)) for a change in policy affecting site-specific variables from $\mathbf{x}$ by altering recreational allocation and hence site specific summer flounder catch rates is defined as:

$$
C V_{i t}(\Delta)=\frac{\log \left(\sum_{i \in S} e^{\mathrm{x}_{i s t}^{0} \beta}\right)-\log \left(\sum_{i \in S} e^{\mathrm{x}_{i s t}^{1} \beta}\right)}{\beta_{t c}}
$$

For total willingness to pay (across the population), we calculate the sample weighted average compensating variation ( $\overline{C V}$ ) and multiply times total number of trips.

## Marginal Willingness to Pay Recreational Sector (Time Cost Excluded)



Table 2: A comparison of Summer Flounder Marginal Willingness to Pay Estimates

| Study | Mean Value <br> per Pound | Opportunity <br> Cost of Time | Weighting | Nested |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\$ 9.86-\$ 2.07$ | Not Included | Yes | No |
|  | $\$ 3.48$ | Included | No | Yes |
|  | $\$ 2.38$ | Not Included | No | Yes |
|  | $\$ 1.45$ | Included | No | No |
|  | $\$ 0.80$ | Not Included | No | No |
|  | $\$ 0.99$ | Included | Yes | No |
|  | $\$ 0.53$ | Not Included | Yes | No |
| Massey et al. | $\$ 1.59$ | Unknown | Unknown | No |

## Policy Simulations: Marginal Willingness to Pay [Preferred Model



## Recreational Model Caveats

- Uses historical data on recreational catch (2010-2014) to characterize current conditions in the fishery.
- Due to data limitations, ignore changes in trips that might occur due to quota changes
- Ignore losses/gains in profits at charter operations, bait shops, and boating repair and supply businesses.
- Due to data limitations (no economic add-on), preferred estimate of MWTP uses benefits transfer methods.

Commercial Analysis

## Overview

- Our analysis differs from the prior work on sector allocation (Gentner et al. 2010; Carter et al. 2008)
- Our analysis uses the Random Utility Model (McFadden 1978) framework
- We use the model as a predictive model of commercial fishermen behavior


## Model Overview

Steps:
(1) Estimate trip-level costs
(2) Estimate a site choice model for commercial fishermen
(3) Combine (1) and (2) into a fleet simulation
(9) Use (1) - (3) to estimate marginal values per a pound

## Step 1: Estimating Trip Level Costs - Outline

- We use trip-level cost data from 2000 through 2014
- Data was obtained from the Social Science Branch of the NMFS Northeast Fisheries Science Center
- Part of the annual data collection of the Northeast Fishery Observer Program (NEFOP)
- We focus only those vessels who landed summer flounder
- Estimate a log-log trip level cost function


## Step 2: Modeling Discrete Choices

- Modeling builds on an extensive literature of spatial choice modeling in fisheries (Curtis and Hicks 2000); (Hicks and Schnier 2008); (Haynie et al. 2009); (Holland and Sutinen 1999,2000); (Smith and Wilen 2003)
- Based on the estimation of a random utility model (RUM) (McFadden 1978). Same model used in recreational section.
- We incorporate alternative specific constants (Timmins and Murdock 2007); (Smith 2005); (Hicks et al. 2012)
- Use 60-day lags to calculate the variables
- 2,337 unique trips between 2000-2014 and 20,900 unique hauls


## The Commercial Choice Model



## Step 3: Policy Simulation

The simulation model uses the parameter estimates from Steps (1) and (2) to simulate fleet behavior

- Step 1: Initialize the TAC in the commercial sector (1,000 metric ton increment up to 24,000 metric tons)
- Step 2: Take a random draw from the parameter distribution
- Step 3: Randomly draw fishing trip from data and calculate probabilities:

$$
P(i, t)=\frac{e^{U(i, t)}}{\sum_{j \in N} e^{U(j, t)}}
$$

and multiply the probability by the expected catch rates and calculate expected catch for each species. E.g. summer flounder:

$$
E\left[\text { Catch }_{S F, t}\right]=\sum_{j \in N} P(j, t) * \operatorname{SFExp}_{j, t}
$$

## Step 3: Policy Simulation, cont.

- Step 4: Reduce the TAC's by the expected catch
- Step 5: Calculate the expected profits from each trip

$$
\sum_{i \in N} P(i, t)\left[\text { SFRev}_{i, t}+\text { BSBRev}_{i, t}+\text { SCUPRev}_{i, t}+\right.
$$

$$
\begin{equation*}
\text { OtherRev } \left._{i, t}-\operatorname{TripCosts}_{i, t}\right] \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

- Step 6: Determine if the current catch exceeds the allocation and if TAC not exceeded return to step 2
- We increase commercial TAC up by 1,000 and then re-run and store results


## Simulation Models

- Model 1: Base model
- Model 2: Base model plus state allocations. We remove vessels from states that have exceeded their state allocations
- Model 3: Base Model + Seasonal fishing patterns. We randomly draw a vessel trip from the distribution to mirror the seasonal distribution. Preferred Model


## Marginal Values

- Construction of Marginal Values:
- We simulate each quota change 40 times and use the convolution method to generate 1,600 simulated outcomes
- Construct 95\% confidence intervals
- Profits are based on the catch of all species


## Commercial Marginal Values for Preferred Model (Model 3)



## Commercial Model Caveats

- Data relies on observer data so it is not a complete data set of all activity
- Short run analysis - prices are not endogeneous, exit/entry
- Model does not account for localized depletion of the resource
- Relies on historical data to characterize current conditions in fishery
- Focus on at-sea commercial behavior and ignores any changes in consumer and produce surplus in the commerical sector solely due to quota changes such as boating and dock services, and losses in consumer surplus for consumers of summer flounder.


## Allocation Analysis

## Equimarginal Principle

If the value of the last pound of fish allocated to the commercial sector is equal to the value of the last pound allocated to the recreational sector, we have maximized benefits to the nation from the fishery.

## Marginal Analysis for the Preferred Models



## Recommendations

- Current allocations are close to, if not, optimal with respect to efficiency.
- Modest changes to quota allocations in either direction, would most likely not decrease national benefits flowing from the fishery.

Appendix

## Marginal Benefits by Sector



## IT Infrastructure

|  | Recreational |  |  | Commercial |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | MySQL | Python | R | MySQL | Python | Matlab |
| Data Acquisition |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Clean Raw Data for DB storage |  | $\times$ |  | $\times$ | $\times$ | $\times$ |
| Store in Database | $\times$ | $\times$ |  | $\times$ | $\times$ |  |
| Data Assembly |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Retrieve from DB | $\times$ | $x$ |  | x | x |  |
| Reshape for Econometric Model |  | $\times$ |  |  | $\times$ | $\times$ |
| Merge and combine |  | $x$ |  |  |  | $\times$ |
| Survey adjusted Means and Totals |  | $\times$ | $\times$ | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Store analysis data in DB | $\times$ | x |  |  |  | $\times$ |
| Econometric Model |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Retrieve from DB | x | $x$ |  |  |  | $x$ |
| Final Assembly |  | $x$ |  |  |  | $x$ |
| Model Estimation |  | $x$ |  |  |  | x |
| Store parameters in DB | x | $\times$ |  |  |  | $\times$ |
| Policy Analysis |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Retrieve data and parameters from DB | $\times$ | $x$ |  |  |  | $x$ |
| Simulate Behavior |  | $x$ |  |  |  | $x$ |
| Calculate Policy Means and Totals |  | $\times$ | x |  |  | $\times$ |

## Summer Flounder Recreational Total Catch by State



## Summer Flounder in Context: Species Caught in NY



## Summer Flounder in Context: Species Targeted in NY



## Summer Flounder in Context: Species Caught in NJ



## Summer Flounder in Context: Species Targeted in NJ



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## Results: RUM Model



## Results: RUM Model, cont.

|  | b_Inm | b_tc | b_bt | b_sg | b_sf_land | b_sf_rel | dum_pr | dum_sh |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| count | 3000.000000 | 3000.000000 | 3000.000000 | 3000.000000 | 3000.000000 | 3000.000000 | 3000.000000 | 3000.000000 |
| mean | 1.261703 | -0.099572 | 0.210776 | 0.828308 | 1.704043 | 0.730967 | 1.522743 | 1.690098 |
| std | 0.013695 | 0.000687 | 0.010831 | 0.014509 | 0.087752 | 0.032410 | 0.027029 | 0.029306 |
| $\boldsymbol{\operatorname { m i n }}$ | 1.216995 | -0.102108 | 0.169941 | 0.777885 | 1.384343 | 0.628437 | 1.433269 | 1.584659 |
| $\mathbf{2 5 \%}$ | 1.252193 | -0.100009 | 0.203579 | 0.818566 | 1.644907 | 0.709574 | 1.504740 | 1.670539 |
| $\mathbf{5 0 \%}$ | 1.261834 | -0.099575 | 0.210678 | 0.828181 | 1.702743 | 0.731825 | 1.522283 | 1.690711 |
| $\mathbf{7 5 \%}$ | 1.271136 | -0.099108 | 0.217989 | 0.838124 | 1.763330 | 0.751281 | 1.541012 | 1.709710 |
| $\boldsymbol{\operatorname { m a x }}$ | 1.315996 | -0.096878 | 0.250116 | 0.877409 | 2.004679 | 0.841560 | 1.621508 | 1.788339 |

## Back to Recreational Model Summary

Table 3: Marginal Willingness to Pay by Quota Allocation

| Quota <br> (Pounds) | Quota <br> (Metric Tons) | Lower 95\% CI | Mean CV | Upper 95\% CI |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 739,856 | 336 | 6.02 | 9.86 | 14.02 |
| $2,219,567$ | 1,007 | 2.03 | 4.46 | 6.93 |
| $3,699,279$ | 1,678 | 1.91 | 3.50 | 5.40 |
| $5,178,991$ | 2,349 | 2.22 | 3.11 | 4.13 |
| $6,473,738$ | 2,936 | 2.17 | 2.76 | 3.37 |
| $7,398,558$ | 3,356 | 2.31 | 2.62 | 2.92 |
| $8,323,378$ | 3,775 | 2.01 | 2.50 | 3.08 |
| $9,618,125$ | 4,363 | 1.66 | 2.49 | 3.38 |
| $11,097,837$ | 5,034 | 0.86 | 2.25 | 3.80 |
| $12,577,549$ | 5,705 | 0.39 | 2.14 | 3.91 |
| $14,057,260$ | 6,376 | -0.35 | 2.07 | 4.52 |

Back to marginal value plot

## Policy Simulations: CV per Pound



In this study we need to analyze allocation policy which will alter landings (keep) of SF. So we calculate mean landings and release rates (numbers of fish) for each mode and site for summer flounder.

## Choice Probability

Following normal conventions on assumptions about site, mode, and species specific errors $(\epsilon)$, we can model the probability that an individual chooses g (species), n (mode), and s (site) as

$$
P(g, n, s)=\frac{e^{U(g, n, s)}}{\sum_{i \in G} \sum_{j \in M} \sum_{k \in S} e^{U(i, j, k)}}
$$

Using likelihood contributions like this for each individual, we define the log-likelihood function.

## Formal Recreational Choice Model

We assume an individual will choose species group $g$, mode $n$, and site $s$ by comparing the alternative specific utilities if it is the best one:

$$
U(g, n, s)+\epsilon_{g, n, s}>U(i, j, k)+\epsilon_{i, j, k} \forall i \in G, j \in M, k \in S
$$

where all species groups are denoted by $G$, all modes $M$, and all sites $S$.

## The Econometric Model: Site-Specific Utility Specification

Ignoring subscripts indexing individuals, we have for summer flounder the utility at each site $k$ and mode $j$ :

$$
\begin{align*}
U(S F, j, k)= & \beta_{t c} T C_{k}+\beta_{\operatorname{lnm}} \log \left(M_{k}\right) \\
& +\beta_{S H}\left(\operatorname{mode}_{j}==S H O R E\right) \\
& +\beta_{P R}\left(\operatorname{mode}_{j}==\text { PRIVATE } / \text { RENTAL }\right) \\
& +\beta_{S F, K} \text { KeepSF }, j, k+\beta_{S F, R} \text { Release }_{S F, j, k} \tag{2}
\end{align*}
$$

## The Econometric Model: Site-Specific Utility Specification,cont.

For the other two species, we have similar specifications. For example, for bottom fish the utility at each site $k$ and mode $j$ :

$$
\begin{align*}
U(B T, j, k)= & \beta_{t c} T C_{k}+\beta_{\ln m} \log \left(M_{k}\right) \\
& +\beta_{S H}\left(\operatorname{mode}_{j}==\operatorname{SHORE}\right) \\
& +\beta_{P R}\left(\operatorname{mode}_{j}==\text { PRIVATE } / \text { RENTAL }\right) \\
& +\beta_{B T} \text { Catch }_{B T, j, k} \tag{3}
\end{align*}
$$

Back to Recreational Choice Model

## Step 1: Estimating Trip Level Costs - Estimates



## Step 1: Predictive Accuracy



## Choice Model Details

Individual $i$ will choose site $j$ if it is the best site:

$$
U_{i j t}+\epsilon_{i j t}>U_{i k t}+\epsilon_{i k t} \forall k \in S
$$

For our application (subscripts for individual, site, and time dropped):

$$
\begin{align*}
U= & \gamma_{i}+\beta_{1} * \text { Distance }_{i j t}+\beta_{2} * \text { SF }_{\text {Revenues }}+\beta_{3} * B S B_{\text {Revenues }}+ \\
& \beta_{4} * S C U P_{\text {Revenues }}+\beta_{5} * \text { Other }_{\text {Revenues }}+\beta+6 * \text { No }_{\text {Choice }} \tag{4}
\end{align*}
$$

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## Step 2: Histogram of Site Choices



## Step 2: RUM - Estimates



## Back to

## Marginal Values for Model 1



## Marginal Value Model 1 - Results

| Allocation (MT) | Mean | Lower $95 \% \mathrm{Cl}$ | Upper $95 \% \mathrm{Cl}$ |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 2,000 | 7.8851 | 6.6453 | 9.0162 |
| 3,000 | 8.1204 | 6.5616 | 9.8310 |
| 4,000 | 7.9752 | 6.2604 | 9.5245 |
| 5,000 | 7.7581 | 6.1539 | 9.4760 |
| 6,000 | 8.1402 | 6.2661 | 9.8561 |
| 7,000 | 8.1273 | 6.0551 | 10.0714 |
| 8,000 | 8.1179 | 5.8691 | 10.5694 |
| 9,000 | 7.7738 | 5.3696 | 10.0241 |
| 10,000 | 8.1125 | 5.2754 | 10.8474 |
| 11,000 | 7.9104 | 4.7984 | 10.9040 |
| 12,000 | 7.9971 | 5.3515 | 10.8735 |
| 13,000 | 8.1800 | 5.4952 | 10.8989 |
| 14,000 | 8.1137 | 4.9322 | 11.4363 |
| 15,000 | 7.8664 | 4.3919 | 11.4297 |
| 16,000 | 8.0085 | 4.3781 | 11.6515 |
| 17,000 | 7.1833 | 3.4895 | 10.6389 |
| 18,000 | 8.3415 | 4.7475 | 12.1810 |
| 19,000 | 7.6772 | 3.3215 | 11.2153 |
| 20,000 | 8.1974 | 4.3329 | 12.8512 |
| 21,000 | 7.3900 | 2.9345 | 11.4773 |
| 22,000 | 7.6961 | 3.4828 | 11.7511 |
| 23,000 | 7.6107 | 2.9050 | $12 . .4311$ |
| 24,000 | 7.2882 | 2.5568 | 11.8850 |

## Marginal Values for Model 2



## Marginal Value Model 2 - Results

| Allocation (MT) | Mean | Lower $95 \% \mathrm{Cl}$ | Upper $95 \% \mathrm{CI}$ |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 2,000 | 6.0685 | 5.4347 | 6.6957 |
| 3,000 | 5.8368 | 4.9449 | 6.7553 |
| 4,000 | 6.1873 | 4.9453 | 7.2509 |
| 5,000 | 5.8575 | 4.5707 | 7.1560 |
| 6,000 | 5.9674 | 4.6613 | 7.4056 |
| 7,000 | 5.8262 | 3.9824 | 7.1283 |
| 8,000 | 5.6894 | 4.2051 | 7.5583 |
| 9,000 | 6.1013 | 4.2939 | 8.1041 |
| 10,000 | 5.5413 | 3.4329 | 7.4886 |
| 11,000 | 5.7093 | 3.8840 | 8.0508 |
| 12,000 | 5.3566 | 3.0163 | 7.1295 |
| 13,000 | 5.9295 | 3.3511 | 8.0747 |
| 14,000 | 5.1982 | 2.7767 | 7.8634 |
| 15,000 | 6.0796 | 3.4642 | 8.6992 |
| 16,000 | 5.3292 | 2.9072 | 7.7538 |
| 17,000 | 5.7339 | 3.3682 | 8.1471 |
| 18,000 | 5.4954 | 3.0646 | 7.9163 |
| 19,000 | 5.2289 | 2.6862 | 7.7639 |
| 20,000 | 5.7643 | 3.2661 | 8.2814 |
| 21,000 | 5.4730 | 2.6802 | 7.8814 |
| 22,000 | 5.6740 | 3.2282 | 8.3438 |
| 23,000 | 5.0712 | 2.2265 | 7.7550 |
| 24,000 | 5.3849 | 2.6989 | 7.9653 |

## Marginal Value Model 3 - Results

| Allocation (MT) | Mean | Lower $95 \% \mathrm{Cl}$ | Upper $95 \% \mathrm{Cl}$ |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 2,000 | 5.4827 | 4.7681 | 6.0625 |
| 3,000 | 5.3583 | 4.5628 | 6.2845 |
| 4,000 | 5.3298 | 4.2755 | 6.4238 |
| 5,000 | 5.3301 | 4.1458 | 6.5119 |
| 6,000 | 5.1533 | 3.8970 | 6.3929 |
| 7,000 | 5.3293 | 3.8611 | 6.7917 |
| 8,000 | 4.9791 | 3.5380 | 6.4686 |
| 9,000 | 5.4968 | 4.0064 | 6.7719 |
| 10,000 | 5.0561 | 3.5626 | 6.6672 |
| 11,000 | 5.0145 | 3.3164 | 6.7422 |
| 12,000 | 4.9652 | 3.1843 | 6.8668 |
| 13,000 | 5.0733 | 2.7426 | 7.5328 |
| 14,000 | 4.8105 | 2.4053 | 7.0192 |
| 15,000 | 4.7111 | 2.7840 | 6.5570 |
| 16,000 | 5.0148 | 2.7127 | 7.1172 |
| 17,000 | 4.9404 | 2.4938 | 7.3306 |
| 18,000 | 4.5149 | 2.3536 | 6.8245 |
| 19,000 | 5.3843 | 3.2686 | 7.7050 |
| 20,000 | 4.5178 | 2.9612 | 7.3274 |
| 21,000 | 5.1218 | 2.9612 | 7.3247 |
| 22,000 | 4.4040 | 1.6833 | 6.7396 |
| 23,000 | 5.0532 | 2.4101 | 7.8775 |
| 24,000 | 4.8707 | 2.1647 | 7.9001 |

Back to marginal value plot

## State Allocations

Table 4: State Allocations for Summer Flounder, Black Sea Bass and Scup

| State | Percentage SF | Percentage BSB | Percentage SCUP |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| ME | $0.0476 \%$ | $0.1210 \%$ | $0.5000 \%$ |
| NH | $0.0005 \%$ | $0.0000 \%$ | $0.5000 \%$ |
| MA | $6.8205 \%$ | $21.5853 \%$ | $13.0000 \%$ |
| RI | $15.6830 \%$ | $56.1894 \%$ | $11.0000 \%$ |
| CT | $2.2571 \%$ | $3.1537 \%$ | $1.0000 \%$ |
| NY | $7.6470 \%$ | $15.8232 \%$ | $7.0000 \%$ |
| NJ | $16.7250 \%$ | $2.9164 \%$ | $20.0000 \%$ |
| DE | $0.0178 \%$ | $0.0000 \%$ | $5.0000 \%$ |
| MD | $2.0391 \%$ | $0.0119 \%$ | $11.0000 \%$ |
| VA | $21.3168 \%$ | $0.1650 \%$ | $20.0000 \%$ |
| NC | $27.4458 \%$ | $0.0249 \%$ | $11.0000 \%$ |

## Seasonal Fishing Patterns



## Policy Analysis: CV for Keep versus Release of SF,cont.

Pre-policy Keep and Release rates at site k , mode j is $\mathrm{Keep}_{S F, j, k}^{0}$ and Release ${ }_{S F, j, k}^{0}$.

Following the policy change (for example giving more Keep to recreational anglers) Keep and Release change to

$$
\begin{align*}
\operatorname{Keep}_{S F, j, k}^{1} & =\text { Keep }_{S F, j, k}^{0} \times(1+\Delta)  \tag{5}\\
\text { Release }_{S F, j, k}^{1} & =\text { Release }_{S F, j, k}^{0}-\Delta \times \text { Keep }_{S F, j, k}^{0} \tag{6}
\end{align*}
$$

Note that: $\operatorname{Keep}_{S F, j, k}^{1}+$ Release $_{S F, j, k}^{1}=\operatorname{Keep}_{S F, j, k}^{0}+$ Release $_{S F, j, k}^{0}$

## Policy Analysis: Quota Changes and Site Attributes

For a $\Delta Q$ pound change in the recreational quota from 2014 levels ( $Q_{2014}$ ), we map quota changes to site specific catch changes by constructing $\Delta$ :

$$
\Delta=\frac{\Delta Q}{Q_{2014}}
$$

and apply the summer flounder catch rate formulas from the previous slide.

```
Back to Policy Change Summary
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[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ Other species groups such as big game, other flat-fish, non-specific targets are ommitted from our analysis.

